En este modulo

  1. CTI in 2026: the volume problem
  2. Intelligence feeds and IOCs
  3. IOC correlation with AI
  4. Automated MITRE ATT&CK mapping
  5. Threat actor profiling
  6. Dark web monitoring
  7. Automated CTI report generation
  8. CTI platforms and tools with AI
  9. Ejercicio practico
  10. Puntos clave

CTI in 2026: the volume problem

A modern CTI team consumes data from 50 to 200 sources: OSINT feeds (OTX, abuse.ch, CIRCL), commercial feeds (Recorded Future, Mandiant, CrowdStrike), CERT advisories (INCIBE, ENISA, CISA), researcher blogs, underground forums, Telegram channels, malware repositories.

The problem is not the lack of data. It is the excess. Every day thousands of new IOCs are published, dozens of threat reports and hundreds of forum posts. A human CTI analyst can read and process between 5 and 10 reports per day if they are detailed. At that pace, 95% of available intelligence goes unprocessed.

AI changes this equation. Not because it is a better analyst than a human (it is not for strategic analysis), but because it can process volume at machine speed and present the human analyst with only what is relevant, already correlated and contextualized.

The intelligence cycle with AI

The classic CTI cycle (direction, collection, processing, analysis, dissemination) does not change with AI. What changes is the speed of each phase:

Intelligence vs data

An IOC without context is data, not intelligence. "IP 185.x.x.x is malicious" is not useful. "IP 185.x.x.x is C2 infrastructure of APT28, active since March 2026, associated with campaigns against the European energy sector, using Cobalt Strike with watermark 391144938" is intelligence. AI converts data into intelligence by adding context automatically.

Intelligence feeds and IOCs

Feeds are the raw material of CTI. They are classified by type, cost and quality:

OSINT feeds (free)

Commercial feeds

Automated ingestion with AI

The challenge with feeds is that each has its own format: STIX 2.1, CSV, proprietary JSON, RSS, HTML from blogs. An AI-powered ingestion pipeline normalizes everything:

# CTI ingestion pipeline
class CTIIngestor:
    def __init__(self):
        self.parsers = {
            "stix": STIXParser(),
            "csv": CSVIOCParser(),
            "rss": RSSParser(),
            "html": HTMLIntelParser()  # Uses LLM to extract IOCs from blogs
        }

    async def ingest_feed(self, feed: FeedConfig) -> list[IOC]:
        raw_data = await self.fetch(feed.url, feed.auth)
        parser = self.parsers[feed.format]
        iocs = parser.parse(raw_data)

        # Automatic enrichment
        for ioc in iocs:
            ioc.reputation = await self.check_reputation(ioc)
            ioc.mitre_techniques = self.map_to_mitre(ioc)
            ioc.related_campaigns = await self.find_campaigns(ioc)

        # Deduplication against existing database
        new_iocs = self.deduplicate(iocs)
        await self.store(new_iocs)
        return new_iocs

The HTMLIntelParser is where AI shines. Given a researcher's blog post (unstructured text), an LLM automatically extracts: IOCs (IPs, hashes, domains, URLs), TTPs (described attack techniques), mentioned actors and referenced CVEs.

IOC correlation with AI

Correlation is where an isolated IOC becomes actionable intelligence. The question is not "is this IP malicious?" but "what campaign does it belong to, who operates it, who is it targeting, and what does this mean for my organization?"

Infrastructure correlation

Threat actors reuse infrastructure. A C2 domain from today may share registrant, ASN, SSL certificate or naming pattern with domains used months ago. A model trained on infrastructure graphs can detect these connections:

Behavioral correlation (TTPs)

Harder to automate but more valuable. Two campaigns using the same techniques, in the same order, against the same sector, are probably from the same actor even if the infrastructure is completely different.

# TTP correlation with embeddings
def correlate_campaigns(new_campaign, known_campaigns):
    # Generate embedding of the TTP pattern
    ttp_sequence = new_campaign.mitre_techniques  # ["T1566.001", "T1059.001", "T1053.005"]
    new_embedding = model.encode(ttp_description(ttp_sequence))

    # Search for campaigns with similar patterns
    similarities = []
    for known in known_campaigns:
        known_embedding = model.encode(ttp_description(known.mitre_techniques))
        score = cosine_similarity(new_embedding, known_embedding)
        if score > 0.85:
            similarities.append((known, score))

    return sorted(similarities, key=lambda x: x[1], reverse=True)

Threat knowledge graph

The most powerful form of correlation is a knowledge graph where nodes are entities (IOCs, actors, campaigns, malware, vulnerabilities, sectors) and edges are relationships ("uses", "attributed to", "exploits", "targets"). An LLM can populate this graph automatically from textual reports.

The value of the graph

With a well-built graph, you can answer questions like: "What actors target my sector? What techniques do they use? What vulnerabilities do they exploit? Have I patched them?" That is strategic intelligence, not just tactical.

Automated MITRE ATT&CK mapping

MITRE ATT&CK is the common language of cybersecurity. Mapping intelligence to ATT&CK enables comparing actors, identifying detection gaps and prioritizing defenses. But manual mapping is slow and subjective.

LLMs for ATT&CK mapping

An LLM can read the description of an attack technique and map it to the correct ATT&CK tactic and technique with precision above 85%. The trick is in the prompt:

MITRE_MAPPING_PROMPT = """
You are a CTI analyst expert in MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15.
Given the following text describing a threat behavior,
identify ALL relevant ATT&CK techniques.

Output format (JSON):
{
  "techniques": [
    {
      "id": "T1566.001",
      "name": "Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment",
      "tactic": "Initial Access",
      "confidence": "high|medium|low",
      "evidence": "excerpt from the text justifying the mapping"
    }
  ]
}

Rules:
- Use sub-techniques when possible (T1059.001 instead of T1059)
- Include all techniques, not just the main one
- If the description is ambiguous, use confidence "low"
- Do not invent techniques that are not in ATT&CK v15

Text to analyze:
{threat_description}
"""

ATT&CK coverage evaluation

Once your detection rules and IOCs are mapped to ATT&CK, you can visualize your coverage. The ATT&CK Navigator shows you a heatmap of which techniques you detect and which you do not. AI can analyze the gaps and prioritize which rules to create first based on the techniques used by the most relevant actors for your sector.

Threat actor profiling

Actor profiling goes beyond "this group is called APT28 and is Russian." A useful profile includes: motivation, technical capability, target sectors, preferred techniques, typical infrastructure, campaign history and tactical evolution.

Automated profiling with LLMs

An LLM fed with the corpus of public reports on an actor can generate a consolidated profile. The process:

  1. Collection: gather all public reports on the actor (Mandiant, CrowdStrike, Kaspersky, researcher blogs, CERTs).
  2. Extraction: for each report, extract IOCs, TTPs, victims, infrastructure, timeline.
  3. Consolidation: merge data from multiple sources, resolve conflicts (different names for the same actor, contradictory attributions).
  4. Profile generation: LLM generates a structured document with standard sections.

Tactical evolution tracking

Actors evolve. APT28 does not use the same techniques in 2026 as in 2020. An AI-powered CTI system can track this evolution:

Dark web monitoring

The dark web (Tor, I2P) and underground forums are critical CTI sources. Stolen credentials, zero-day exploits, corporate network access and hacktivist activity are sold and coordinated there.

What to monitor

AI for dark web intelligence

Manual dark web monitoring is inefficient and risky. AI automates:

Legality and ethics

Monitoring the dark web for defensive CTI is legal in most jurisdictions. Buying stolen credentials, interacting with malicious actors or accessing compromised systems is not. Define clear policies with your legal team before starting. "Observe only, never participate" is the baseline rule.

Automated CTI report generation

A CTI team produces three types of reports, each for a different audience:

Tactical report (for SOC)

Fresh IOCs, detection rules, immediate actions. Format: IOC list with minimal context, Sigma/YARA rules, blocking instructions. An LLM can generate these reports automatically every time a new campaign is detected.

Operational report (for technical teams)

Campaign analysis, detailed TTPs, hardening recommendations. Format: 5-10 page document with standard sections (executive summary, technical analysis, IOCs, recommendations). An LLM can generate the draft that the analyst reviews and adjusts.

Strategic report (for leadership)

Trends, sector threat landscape, security investment recommendations. Format: 3-5 slide presentation without technical jargon. An LLM can translate technical intelligence into business language.

# CTI report generation with LLM
def generate_cti_report(campaign, audience="tactical"):
    prompts = {
        "tactical": """Generate a tactical CTI report. Include:
            - IOCs (table with type, value, description)
            - Sigma detection rules
            - Immediate blocking actions
            Audience: SOC Tier 1/Tier 2 analysts. Maximum 2 pages.""",

        "operational": """Generate an operational CTI report. Include:
            - Executive summary (3 paragraphs)
            - Attack chain analysis (kill chain)
            - TTPs mapped to MITRE ATT&CK
            - IOCs with infrastructure context
            - Hardening recommendations
            Audience: security team. 5-10 pages.""",

        "strategic": """Generate a strategic CTI report. Include:
            - Potential business impact (no technical jargon)
            - Geopolitical context of the actor
            - Sector trends
            - Investment recommendations
            Audience: CISO and leadership. Maximum 3 pages, business language."""
    }

    return llm.generate(
        system_prompt=prompts[audience],
        campaign_data=campaign.to_context()
    )

CTI platforms and tools with AI

TIP (Threat Intelligence Platform) platforms

Open source tools with AI

Ejercicio practico

Ejercicio TS02: CTI pipeline with AI
  1. Set up a local instance of MISP or OpenCTI (Docker compose).
  2. Connect 3 OSINT feeds: abuse.ch ThreatFox, CISA KEV and AlienVault OTX.
  3. Write a Python script that takes an IOC (hash, IP or domain) and automatically enriches it by querying VirusTotal, AbuseIPDB and Shodan.
  4. Use an LLM (local or API) to generate an automatic profile of a threat actor from 3 public reports about the same group.
  5. Generate an automatic tactical report from the day's IOCs in ThreatFox, including Sigma rules.
  6. Bonus: implement a basic knowledge graph with Neo4j connecting IOCs, actors, campaigns and MITRE techniques.

Puntos clave

Puntos clave from TS02

  1. CTI without AI is like drinking from a fire hose. The data volume exceeds human capacity. AI filters, correlates and contextualizes.
  2. An IOC without context is data, not intelligence. AI adds the context: actor, campaign, target sector, associated techniques.
  3. Infrastructure correlation (DNS, SSL, WHOIS) and TTP correlation are complementary. Use both.
  4. Automated MITRE ATT&CK mapping with LLMs exceeds 85% accuracy and reduces analysis time from hours to minutes.
  5. The dark web is a critical CTI source, but requires clear legal policies. Observe only, never participate.
  6. Generate reports for three audiences: tactical (SOC), operational (technical team), strategic (leadership). An LLM can produce all three from the same data.
Guia de estudio — Conceptos clave de TS02

CTI en 2026: el problema del volumen

  • Recoleccion:crawlers automaticos que ingestan feeds en tiempo real, parsean informes PDF y extraen IOCs de blogs.
  • Procesamiento:NER para extraer entidades (IPs, hashes, dominios, CVEs, actores), normalizacion a STIX 2.1, deduplicacion.
  • Analisis:LLMs que correlacionan IOCs con campanas conocidas, mapean a MITRE ATT&CK y generan hipotesis.
  • Diseminacion:generacion automatica de informes en lenguaje natural, adaptados al publico objetivo (ejecutivo vs tecnico).
  • Inteligencia vs datos: Un IOC sin contexto es un dato, no inteligencia. "La IP 185.x.x.x es maliciosa" no es util. "La IP 185.x.x.x es infraestructura C2 de APT28, activa desde marzo 2026, asociada a campanas contra el sector energetico europeo, usando Cobalt Strike con watermark 391144938" es inteligencia. La IA convierte datos en inteligencia anadiendo contexto automaticamente.

Feeds de inteligencia e IOCs

  • AlienVault OTX:pulses comunitarios con IOCs e informes. Calidad variable (depende de quien los publique).
  • CIRCL (MISP feeds):feeds curados por el CERT de Luxemburgo. Alta calidad, bajo volumen.
  • CISA KEV:catalogo de vulnerabilidades explotadas activamente. Obligatorio para cualquier equipo de CTI.
  • PhishTank, OpenPhish:feeds especificos de phishing.
  • Recorded Future:el mas completo. Cubre OSINT, dark web, paste sites, foros. Caro (desde 10K USD/anio).
  • Mandiant (Google):excelente en APT profiling y malware analysis. Informes muy detallados.
HTMLIntelParser

Correlacion de IOCs con IA

  • Passive DNS:historico de resoluciones DNS. Si el dominio sospechoso.com resolvio a la misma IP que otro dominio atribuido a APT29, hay conexion.
  • Certificados SSL:actores que usan el mismo certificado o CA para multiples dominios.
  • WHOIS historico:mismos datos de registro (nombre, email, organizacion) en dominios diferentes.
  • Patrones de naming:LLMs pueden detectar patrones lexicos en nombres de dominio usados por el mismo actor (ej: variaciones de marcas + palabras clave de la industria objetivo).
  • El valor del grafo: Con un grafo bien construido, puedes responder preguntas como: "Que actores apuntan a mi sector? Que tecnicas usan? Que vulnerabilidades explotan? Las tengo parcheadas?". Eso es inteligencia estrategica, no solo tactica.

Mapeo automatico a MITRE ATT&CK

  • Usa sub-tecnicas cuando sea posible (T1059.001 en vez de T1059)
  • Incluye todas las tecnicas, no solo la principal
  • Si la descripcion es ambigua, usa confidence "low"
  • No inventes tecnicas que no esten en ATT&CK v15

Perfilado de actores de amenaza

  • Recoleccion:reunir todos los informes publicos sobre el actor (Mandiant, CrowdStrike, Kaspersky, blogs de investigadores, CERTs).
  • Extraccion:para cada informe, extraer IOCs, TTPs, victimas, infraestructura, timeline.
  • Consolidacion:fusionar datos de multiples fuentes, resolver conflictos (diferentes nombres para el mismo actor, atribuciones contradictorias).
  • Generacion de perfil:LLM genera un documento estructurado con secciones estandar.
  • Nuevas herramientas adoptadas (cambio de Cobalt Strike a Sliver, o a herramientas propias).
  • Cambios en vectores de acceso inicial (de spearphishing a explotacion de VPN).

Monitorizacion de dark web

  • Foros de venta de accesos:actores que venden acceso RDP, VPN o credenciales de empleados de tu organizacion o sector.
  • Leak sites de ransomware:donde los grupos de ransomware publican datos robados. Si tu empresa aparece, ya es tarde para prevenir pero no para responder.
  • Paste sites:Pastebin y similares donde se publican dumps de credenciales, bases de datos y configuraciones.
  • Canales de Telegram:grupos donde se comparten IOCs, herramientas y se coordinan ataques (especialmente hacktivismo).
  • Marketplaces:venta de malware-as-a-service, phishing kits, exploits.
  • Crawling seguro:bots que navegan foros .onion de forma automatica y extraen contenido.

Siguiente: TS03 - AI for Automated GRC

We move from detection and intelligence to compliance: how AI automates GRC for ENS, NIS2, DORA and ISO 27001.

Ir al modulo TS03